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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), Appellants Ted Duke and Maria
Del Carmen Savala Cardenas (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" or "Appellants"), by and through their
undersigned counsel of record John Martinez, hereby submit the following Reply Brief:
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ARGUMENT
I.
Plaintiffs properly preserved all issues for appeal
II.
Defendants fail to address the pivotal question whether
Sections 48-2C-710G) and 48-2c-809 require that a "court" make
an independent "judicial determination" in order to expel a member or
remove a manager from a limited liability company
III.
Defendants also fail to address the pivotal question whether
the Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution
require that a "court" make an independent "judicial determination" in
order to expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability
company
IV. The trial court did not conduct a "judicial determination"
V.
The proceedings by the arbitrator were not a "judicial determination"
by a "court"

1
1

4

7
8
11

VI.

The parties' arbitration agreement did not waive the right to a
"judicial determination"

12

CONCLUSION

12

REPLY ADDENDUM

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UTAH CONSTITUTION
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11

7
7

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
UTAHCODE § 10-9a-801(2)(a)
UTAH CODE § 19-6-205(5)(a)
UTAHCODE § 48-2c-701
UTAHCODE § 48-2c-710(3
UTAHCODE § 48-2c-802(c)
UTAHCODE § 48-2c-809
UTAH CODE § 78-31a-122
UTAHCODE § 78-31a-123
UTAHCODE § 78-31a-124
UTAH CODE § 78-31a-126

6
6
7
1,4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12
7
1,2, 4, 5, 6, 8,11,12
6
6
6
4

UTAH RULES
UTAH RULES APP. PROC. 24(C)

ii

CASES
CCA L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42,116 P.3d 366
Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 118 Utah 41,
233 P.2d 699 (1951)
Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070(Utah 1981)
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,44 P.3d 663
Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, 114 P.3d 546
State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941)
SECONDARY AUTHORITY
Charles Reich, THE NEW PROPERTY, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)
iii

1, 13
8
12
12
7, 11
6
5
8

ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs properly preserved all issues for appeal
Plaintiffs properly preserved all four issues for appeal as follows:
Issue I: Did the trial court violate Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 of the Utah

Revised Limited Liability Act by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expelling both
Appellants as members-and removing Appellant Duke as manager-of a limited liability
company, even though such Sections expressly require that a "court" make an independent
"judicial determination" about whether such sanctions should be imposed? (R. 371 -Opening
Brief Addendum Exh. 4,11. 14-17, p.184; R. 202, 204-Memo. in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for TRO, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 1, p.3;1 R. 213, 215-17-Memo. in Opp. to
Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to
Vacate Award, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.3-5)2

1

. That memorandum provides in relevant part:
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award
on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to
expel Plaintiffs from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved
for "judicial determination" by statute and constitutional principle.
2

. That memorandum provides in relevant part:
IILA. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Expulsion of
Members of Limited Liability Companies can only be Accomplished "by judicial
determination,11 Not by Arbitrators
The "error" that the arbitrator committed here is that UCA § 48-2c-710 (3), by its
plain, express terms, provides for expulsion "by judicial determination." The Utah Supreme
Court has recently stated that
"The requirement that expulsions be made by judicial determination affords
members,... through the intervention of a neutral and impartial fact finder, the most
reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our society."
CCD. L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, % 26, 529 Utah Adv. Rep. 38.
1

Issue II: Did the trial court violate the Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the
Utah Constitution by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expelling both Appellants
as members~and removing Appellant Duke as manager-of a limited liability company, even
though such Clauses guarantee Appellants a "day in court" for an independent judicial
determination about whether such sanctions should be imposed? (R. 37l-Opening Brief
Addendum Exh. 4,11.14-17,p. 184; R. 202,204-Memo. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for TRO, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 1, p.3 ;3 R. 213,217-18-Memo. in Opp. to Defendants'

In this case, the arbitrator took it upon himself to make a determination that the
Legislature expressly reserved for "judicial determination." As the Utah Supreme Court made
clear, the policy reason for this reservation is to provide members of limited liability
companies with "the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our
society," in order to adequately protect the substantial rights that membership in a limited
liability company confers. Accordingly, only a court can determine expulsion.
B. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Managers may
only be removed by Judicial Proceedings Not by Arbitrators
The Company is a limited liability company operating pursuant to the authority of the
Utah statute. The Company is managed by its two Managers. Ted Duke, and Randall
Graham
Section 48-2c-809 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended provides as follows:
§ 48-2c-809. Removal by judicial proceeding
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a company's designated office
is located, or if it has no designated office in this state, its registered office is located,
may remove a manager in a proceeding commenced either by the company or by its
members holding at least 25% of the interests in profits of the company if the Court
finds that:
It is clear that the only authority that can remove Ted Duke as Manager is the district
court in this state; not an arbitrator. A look at the balance of § 809 clearly mandates, in terms
of its enforcement governance, that only a court of competent jurisdiction can remove a
manager from his position as a manager of the limited liability company
3

. That memorandum provides in relevant part:
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award
on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to
expel Plaintiffs from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved
2

Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Award,
Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.5-6)4
Issue III: Did the trial court err by confirming the arbitrator's award herein, even
though the arbitrator made no findings to support such award and thereby failed to "make a
record" as required by Section 78-31a-120 of the Utah Arbitration Act? (R. 371-Opening
Brief Addendum Exh. 2, p.3 ("The comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings
of fact or conclusions of law.")).
Plaintiffs' counsel emphasized to the trial court that the arbitrator had made only
"comments," and not actual findings and the trial court, after acknowledging that fact,
nevertheless ruled that the arbitrator's "non-findings" were sufficient. (R. 37\-Reply Brief
Addendum Exh. 3, p.189,11.8-25; p.190,11.1-25; p.191,11.1-9)5
for "judicial determination" by statute and constitutional principle.
4

. That memorandum provides in relevant part:
IV. Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution also require that
Expulsion of Members of Limited Liability Companies Can Only be Accomplished "by
judicial determination," Not by Arbitrators
Plaintiffs' right to have a court determine whether they will be deprived of the
substantial rights of membership in a limited liability company is also protected by the Due
Process and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that both clauses "guarantee that litigants will have [their] 'day in court'", [quoting Utah
Due Process and Open Courts constitutional Clauses].

The deprivation of the right to membership in a limited liability company is a
precious and protected right of property. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to their "day in
court" to preserve that interest, [citing Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, K38,44 P.3d 663].
5

. The trial court was clearly perplexed, but ruled that the arbitrator's statements were
sufficient nonetheless:
THE COURT: And I've seen a lot of arbitration awards over the years; I've never seen that
kind of language included in an award
THE COURT: He says that they are provided to assist the parties and their counsel to
understand the reasons that form the basis for the award. However he calls them findings of
3

Issue IV: Did the trial court err by refusing to award Appellants their attorney fees,
costs and interest as required by Section 78-3 la-126(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act? (R. 213,
221-22-Memo. in Opp. to Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award and in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Award, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 2, pp.9-10)6
II.

Defendants fail to address the pivotal question whether Sections 48-2c-710(3) and
48-2c-809 require that a "court" make an independent "judicial determination"
in order to expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability
company
The arguments in Part I of Defendants1 brief simply assume that a court is only

required to "review11 an arbitrator's award. Def Brief, pp. 14-23. Defendants thus utterly fail
to address the pivotal question about the meaning of the provisions in Utah Code Sections
48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 that a "court" make an independent "judicial determination" in
order to expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability company.
The starting point is the language the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act
which provides in relevant part that a member of a company may be expelled:
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial determination that
the member:
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially affected the
company's business;
fact or conclusions. I don't think he has to. I think he's saying, "These are the reasons why
I've given my award." And I think they are of an assist in trying to understand the whole
context of the award.
(R. 311-Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.189,11.23-25; p.191,11.3-9)
6

. That memorandum provides in relevant part:
VIII. Plaintiffs Should be Awarded Their Costs, Attorney Fees and Expenses of
Litigation
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-126 provides for the award of costs, attorney fees and
expenses of litigation in vacating an arbitrator's award. Since the arbitrator's award should
be vacated in its entirety, Plaintiffs hereby request such costs, attorney fees and expenses.
4

or
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business which makes it
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the member.
UTAH CODE

§ 48-2c-710(3) (Emphasis added). And with respect to removal of managers of

limited liability companies, the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act further
provides:
(1) The district court... may remove a manager ... in a proceeding ... if the court
finds that:
(a) the manager engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of
authority or discretion with respect to the company; and
(b) removal is in the best interests of the company.
(2) The court that removes a manager may bar the manager from reelection for a
period prescribed by the court.
(5) If the court orders removal of a manager or member under this section, the clerk
of the court shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the division for filing.
UTAH CODE

§ 48-2c-809 (Emphasis added).

The plain language of these sections unambiguously assigns to a "court" the exclusive
responsibility to make a "judicial determination" in order to expel a member or remove a
manager from a limited liability company. These sections thus envision an original
proceeding, not an appellate "review" of an arbitrator's award as suggested by Defendants.
Original "judicial determinations," in contrast to appellate "review" proceedings, are
those in which the power of a court "in dealing with the pleadings and evidence, in the
application of the law and in the rendition ofjudgment according to the right of the case...is
no different from what it would be if the case were begun there originally...." State v.
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1941)(citations omitted).

5

When the Legislature intends to provide for appellate "review" in Utah courts of
proceedings previously held before other bodies or officials, it has done so in clear and
unambiguous terms. See e.g., Utah Code §10-9a-801(2)(a)("Any person adversely affected
by a final [land use] decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this
chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court...."); Utah Code
§ 19-6-205(5)(a)("Any person adversely affected by the board's [hazardous waste facility
siting] decision may seek judicial review of the decision by filing a petition for review with
the district court... ."). In contrast, in Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 the Legislature
has explicitly provided for original proceedings, not appellate review.
Defendants seekto elevate the general provisions ofthe Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
dealing with arbitration remedies, with confirming arbitration awards and with vacating
arbitration awards, (Utah Code Sections 78-31a-122, 123, 124, respectively), over the
specific provisions ofthe Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act requiring "judicial
determinations" by a "court" in order to expel a member or remove a manager from an LLC.
UTAH CODE

§§ 48-2c-710(3), 48-2c-809. This would violate the fundamental principle that

specific statutes control over general statutes. See e.g., Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12,
f 10,114 P.3d 546 (code section which specifically applied to campaign disclosure statements
held to govern over Election Code provision applicable to elections generally).
As a matter of policy, the Legislature obviously was concerned about the manner in
which members of LLC's could be expelled, and managers could be removed, because ofthe
extremely important rights that such membership and management positions in a limited

6
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exclusively by w a y of original proceedings.
III.

Defendants also fail to address the pivotal question whether the Due Process and
Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution require that a " c o u r t " make an
independent "judicial determination" in order to expel a member or remove a
m a n a g e r from., a limited liability company
A "day in court" is a property right protected by the Due Process Clause . >f •l . • :

Constitution as well as a liberty right protected by the O p e n Courts Clause of the Utah
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followed. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970)(welfare benefits cannot be
withdrawn without due process); Charles Reich, THE NEW PROPERTY, 73 YALE L J. 733,
783-87 (1964)(government benefits are "new property" protected by procedural due process).
And that statute expressly provides for a "judicial determination" by a "court."
IV.

The trial court did not conduct a "judicial determination"
Defendants contend that "the four hearings held before the trial court regarding the

Award" constituted a "judicial determination" regarding the merits of the arbitrator's award.
Def. Brief, p.28. Close examination reveals, however, that in none of those four hearings did
the trial court consider the merits of whether Plaintiffs should be expelled as members and
Plaintiff Duke removed as a manager of the LLC, as required by UTAH CODE § 48-2c710(3)("judicial determination" required to expel a member); UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809 (only
a "court" may remove a manager).7 The merits were not considered.
At the August 17, 2005 hearing, lasting 35 minutes, the trial court only considered
whether to issue a TRO at the request of Defendants to maintain the status quo. (R. 371Transcript of trial court hearing, Wednesday, August 17,2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh.
3, pp. 16-17, 30, 37) No evidence was presented.
At the August 24, 2005 hearing, lasting 72 minutes, the trial court only considered
whether to issue a preliminary injunction, also at the request of Defendants, to maintain the
status quo. (R. 371-Transcript of trial court hearing, Wednesday, August 24, 2005, Reply
Brief Addendum Exh. 3, pp .3 8,41,44,92-93,96) The trial court emphasized that it was not
7

. And, surprisingly, Defendants also concede that "the trial court did not address the
substantive issues regarding the parties' dispute." Def. Brief, p. 16.
8

rt illi: lg 01 1 the in lerits of the arbiti atoi 's a \ \ at ;:I:
Well, the temporary restraining order, of course, is granted on the basis of probability
of prevailing - final determination prevailing. So with respect to your - with respect
to your assumption that the Court has already ruled on that, I've only ruled on the
probability of prevailing not on the ultimate fact.
(Id. ™ J
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the order.")). But after five witnesses had testified, Defendants admitted they had not served
the TRO on Plaintiffs, so the trial court concluded there was n<) violation of the TRO, and
continued the matter. (Id. ,
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argument about whether "to convert the TRO to a preliminary iniunction." (R. J /1 -11
of trial court hearing, Tuesday, September 13, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.97,
pA'K ,111 ("'• I lK 11 I "- 'i' I I lit iiiiil court emphasized that it was not considering the merits of

THE COURT: Okay. And go ahead and tell nic, then, v\nai
converting the TRO to preliminary or permanent injunction.
THE COURT: I'm not talking about the award. I'm talking about the Court's order
that's in place, that been in place for. I don't know, a month and a half, I guess.
(Id (i I l l i II <l ft III I " I I I
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the merits of the award were not under consideration:
MR. COLESSIDES: Is the Court going u i -.ke the issue ,;. the award, the
confirmation of the award, Your Honor?
IHE COURT: I don't think that today is the day to do that. I think we need to hear,
perhaps, more evidence on that issue. I don't want to even go into that until we have

the status re-established. So we can set another time to do that.
(Id. p.151,11.16-23)
The October 14,2005 hearing, lasting 61 minutes, was the only one at which the trial
court had before it the Defendants' request for confirmation of the award and the Plaintiffs1
request that the award instead should be vacated. (R. 371-Transcript of trial court hearing,
Friday, October 14, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.156,11.12-16; p.195) Instead of
making an independent judicial determination, however, the trial court simply rubberstamped the arbitrator's award. The court signed a two-page "Order Confirming Arbitration
Award" that provided simply that "The Award issued by arbitrator Kent B. Scott on August
11, 2005 (the 'Award1) is confirmed. (R. 263-64; Opening Brief Addendum Exh. 2, f 1, pp.
1-2) The court also signed off on the "Judgement [sic] Conforming to Arbitration Award"
submitted by Appellees, which provided merely that
"The Court granted Randal and David Graham's Motion for Order Confirming
Arbitration Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award. For the reasons set
forth in the in the [sic] Award of Arbitrator Kent B. Scott dated August 11,2005 (the
'Award'), the court enters judgment...."
(R. 274; Opening Brief Addendum Exh. 3, p.l) The "Judgement" simply "...copied
everything verbatim, including nothing more, and leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the
award, other than the beginning statements and the concluding signatures." (R. 371Transcript of trial court hearing, Friday, October 14, 2005, Reply Brief Addendum Exh. 3,
p.193, 11.8-11) The trial court emphasized that its "Judgement" "...[did not do] anything
different from signing the confirmation order...." (Id. p. 194,1.4)

10

Indeed, the trial court referred to the arbitrator's award as "...a judicial determination."
(Id. p. 187, 11.14-15) The trial court concluded by emphasizing that it was making no
independent determination, but simply rubber-stamping the arbitrator's award:
"I think I've arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe 150
arbitration cases. I have served as an arbitrator also on a number of cases. And I feel
that it is a ~ it is a good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the award
of the arbitrator has such a potential finality. And in this instance, it's obvious that the
plaintiffs don't agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's their
prerogative. But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't be enforced under the law."
(14 p.195,11.2-11)
In summary, the merits concerned whether Plaintiffs should be expelled as members
and Plaintiff Duke removed as a manager of the LLC, pursuant to UTAH CODE § 48-2c710(3)("judicial determination" required to expel a member) and UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809
(only a "court" may remove a manager). At the first three hearings, the trial court expressly
and emphatically avoided dealing with that question. At the fourth hearing, although it
acknowledged the issue was before it, the trial court simply rubber-stamped the arbitrator's
determination.
V.

The proceedings by the arbitrator were not a "judicial determination11 by a
"court"
Defendants contend that the arbitration proceedings were a "judicial determination"

by a "court". Def. Brief, pp. 12,24. Arbitration, however, is a "quasi-judicial" proceeding, not
a "judicial" one. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6,132,44 P.3d 663. And it defies
both logic and language to contend an arbitrator is a "court".

11

If the Legislature had intended to give arbitrators the power to expel members or
remove managers of LLCs, it could have provided for "quasi-judicial" determinations by
"arbitrators." Instead, it provided for "judicial determinations" by "courts". Defendants'
argument to the contrary seeks nothing less than to re-write legislation.
VI.

The parties' arbitration agreement did not waive the right to a "judicial
determination"
Making only a general reference "to the Operating Agreement's arbitration provision,"

Defendants contend Plaintiffs waived their right to a judicial determination as required by
statute and constitutional provisions. Def. Brief, p.29.
As set out in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the Operating Agreement did not waive the
right to an independent judicial determination because such a waiver must be "expressed in
the most unequivocal terms." Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1074
(Utah 1981); Opening Brief, pp. 16-17. As this court has emphasized, "The dictionary
definition of the word, 'unequivocal,' is as follows: 'Not doubtful; not ambiguous; clear;
sincere."' Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.. 118 Utah 41,45,233 P.2d
699, 701 (1951). And Defendants point to no such provision in the Operating Agreement
waiving the right to an independent judicial determination provided to Plaintiffs by Utah
Code Sections 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809.
Moreover, even if such an unequivocal waiver appeared in the Operating Agreement,
as also set out in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, such a provision would be unenforceable because
it would violate the express terms of state statutes meant to guarantee a judicial
determination, which this court has described as "the most reliable safeguard against
12

inequitable treatment available in our society." CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^J 26,116
P.3d 366; Opening Brief, pp. 17-18.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should be ordered to vacate the arbitrator's award and to issue such
orders as will compensate Appellants for harms resulting from the arbitrator's unlawful
award, including payment by Defendants of Plaintiffs' attorney fees, costs and interest in the
proceedings below as well as on this appeal.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2006.

MARTINEZ
Attorney for Appellants

13

REPLY ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for TRO
(R. 202-206)

Exhibit 2:

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Confirmation of Award and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate
Award (R. 213-223)

Exhibit 3:

Excerpts from Transcript of trial court hearings. (R. 371)
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PLAINTIFFS' REPLY
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1
(Plaintiffs' Memo, in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for TRO)

NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: 801.521-4441
Fax: 801.521-4452
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
Civil Case No. 04092 W 2 n 4
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual; and
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual,

(Arbitrator: Kent B. Scott)
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Ted Duke and
Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel of
record, hereby submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the
Defendants' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
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INTRODUCTION
By order dated February 23,2005, this court ordered arbitration of the parties1 dispute.
On Thursday, August 11, 2005, Arbitrator Kent B. Scott issued an award expelling Plaintiffs
from Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC"), a limited liability company of which both were
members and Plaintiff Duke also was manager.
Defendants have moved for a Temporary Restraining Order. For each of the following
grounds, Defendants* motion should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I. Defendants have unclean hands because they failed to move to confirm the arbitrator's
award, and instead engaged in self-help which provoked a confrontation
A party in whose favor an arbitrator's award has been rendered may move to confirm the
award.1 The award by itself is not self-executing.2 Defendants have belatedly recognized this
reality by moving to confirm the award here.
Before moving to confirm the award, however, defendants by their own admission
engaged in self-help and, predictably, precipitated a confrontation that the requirement for
confirmation of an award is intended to avoid. Defendants therefore have unclean hands and

\ Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-123; Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. 2002
UT6,1J34,44P.3d663.
2

. See Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Company, 108 Idaho 181, 183,
697 P.2d 1195,1197 (an arbitrator's award is not self-enforcing, that is why the statute
distinguishes between a "judgment" and an "award").
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should not be rewarded with the equitable relief of a temporary restraining order.
II. Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits
Plaintiffs have concurrently herewith filed a Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award on
the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. As set out in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities accompanying such Motion, the arbitrator took it upon himself to expel Plaintiffs
from a limited liability company, which is a function exclusively reserved for "judicial
determination" by statute and constitutional principle.
Accordingly, defendants cannot demonstrate a "substantial likelihood" of prevailing on
the merits, and their request for a temporary restraining order therefore should be denied. Utah
R. Civ. P. 65A(e).
HI. Defendants have not supported their Motion with admissible evidence
A movant for a temporary restraining order must demonstrate the factual foundation for
its request by admissible evidence.3 Defendants1 motion herein is not supported by any affidavit
or other admissible evidence. The only affidavit is that made by David R. Williams; it is not
admissible and therefore, should not be allowed to be considered by the Court; it contains
double and triple hearsay evidence. By separate motion plaintiffs have objected to the Williams'
affidavit. Accordingly, defendants1 motion should be denied.

3

. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)("A restraining order...may issue only upon a showing by the
applicant...").
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IV. Defendants fail to set out the nature of the relief they seek
Nowhere in their moving papers do defendants set out what it is that they want this court
to enjoin. Without a specific description of what it is they seek to enjoin, Plaintiffs could not
possibly be expected to obey, and this Court could not be expected to be able to enforce.4
DATED t h i s / / c l a y of August, 2005.

NICKJ.COi
Attorney forPlaintiffs

4

. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(d)(f,Every restraining order...shall be specific in terms and shall
describe in reasonable detail...the act or acts sought to be restrained.").
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned filed the original of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court:
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
and served a copy of the foregoing upon the following:
David R. Williams
Woodbury & Kesler, PC
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358
this ff
%1_day
dayo:
of August, 2005 addressed as set forth above.
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PLAINTIFFS' REPLY
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2
(Plaintiffs' Memo, in Opp. to Defendants' Motion for Confirmation of Award
and in Snnnort of Plaintiff^1 IVTntinn tt\ Va/»o*o Awowi\
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: 801.521-4441
Fax: 801.521-4452
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM an individual; and
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSIT1 ON
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ORDER CONFIRMING
ARBITRATION AWARD
AND
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO VACATE
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD
Civil Case No. 04092574
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
(Arbitrator: Kent B. Scott)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-124 and § 78-31a-126, Plaintiffs Ted Duke and
Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel of
record, hereby submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their
Motion to Vacate the arbitrator's award issued by Arbitrator Kent B. Scott on Thursday, August
11,2005, on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and request costs, attorney
fees and expenses of litigation in overturning such arbitrator's award.
D \WPDOCS\du 05\memo vacate award 081705 I wpd

INTRODUCTION
By order dated February 23,2005, this court ordered arbitration of the parties1 dispute.
On Thursday, August 11,2005, Arbitrator Kent B. Scott ("arbitrator") issued an award expelling
Plaintiffs from Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC" or the "Company"), a limited liability
company of which both were members and Plaintiff Duke also was one of the Managers. A copy
of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC, (the
"Agreement" or the Operating Agreement") is appended herein marked exhibit "A" and by this
reference is incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
The arbitrator based his order of expulsion on his determination that grounds for such
expulsion existed under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c). As set forth below, the
arbitrator thereby exceeded his authority, therefore the arbitrator's award in its entirety should be
vacated.
ARGUMENT
I. Applicable Law
The parties through their agreement have provided that ,fThe arbitration procedure shall
be governed by the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16... . nl As this court
determined in its prior order, the substantive provisions of the federal act, as well as the
procedural provisions, are mirrored by the Utah Arbitration Act.

*. See Exhibit "A." Amended Operating Agreement, f 8.3(a).
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II. The Arbitrator's Award May be Vacated for "Exceeding Authority"
Although the terms of the statutes differ somewhat, under both the federal and state
statutes, the arbitrator's award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator "exceeded" his
authority. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)("where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made; Utah Code §§ 78-31a-124(l)(d)("an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority").
An arbitrator "exceeds authority" by acting in "manifest disregard of the law."2 An
arbitrator acts in "manifest disregard of the law" when "the error is obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified as an arbitrator" and "implies that
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to
ignore or pay no attention to it."3
IIL A. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Expulsion of
Members of Limited Liability Companies can only be Accomplished "by judicial
determination," Not by Arbitrators
The "error" that the arbitrator committed here is that UCA § 48-2c-710 (3), by its plain,
express terms, provides for expulsion "by judicial determination." The Utah Supreme Court has
recently stated that
"The requirement that expulsions be made by judicial determination affords members,...

2

. Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton. 2001 UT 36, If 7, 23 P.3d 1035 (action in
"manifest disregard of law" constitutes "exceeding authority").
3

. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996).

D \WPDOCS\du 05\memo vacate awani 081705 1 wpd

3

through the intervention of a neutral and impartial fact finder, the most reliable safeguard
against inequitable treatment available in our society.1'4
In this case, the arbitrator took it upon himself to make a determination that the
Legislature expressly reserved for "judicial determination." As the Utah Supreme Court made
clear, the policy reason for this reservation is to provide members of limited liability companies
with "the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our society," in order
to adequately protect the substantial rights that membership in a limited liability company
confers. Accordingly, only a court can determine expulsion.
B. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act Provides That Managers may only be
removed by Judicial Proceedings Not by Arbitrators
The Company is a limited liability company operating pursuant to the authority of the
Utah statute. The Company is managed by its two Managers. Ted Duke, and Randall Graham.
Under UCA §48-2c-804(6)(d) "a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident of
this state;" It is obvious that the reason that the arbitrator did not include in the AWARD the
removal of Ted Duke as a manager, because he assumed that this was a "Management by
Members" limited liability company, as provided for by UCA §48-2c-803. That in itself is an
error.
Section 48-2c-809 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended provides as follows:
§ 48-2c-809. Removal by judicial proceeding
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a company's designated office is
4

. CCD. L.C. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ^ 26, 529 Utah Adv. Rep. 38.
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located, or if it has no designated office in this state, its registered office is located, may
remove a manager in a proceeding commenced either by the company or by its members
holding at least 25% of the interests in profits of the company if the Court finds that:
It is clear that the only authority that can remove Ted Duke as a Manager is the district
court in this state; not an arbitrator. A look at the balance of § 809 clearly mandates, in terms of
its enforcement governance, that only a court of competent jurisdiction can remove a manager
from his position as a manager of the limited liability company.
For the many reasons stated in the CCD, LLC v Millshap case the arbitrator's award
should also be vacated in its entirety, and particularly, since the actual "AWARD" does not order
the removal of Ted Duke as one of the Managers.5 The arbitrator's written comments cannot act
as authority for Ted Duke's removal as a Manager of the Company.
Respectfully, the arbitrator's award should also be reversed on those grounds.
IV, Due Process and Open Courts Clauses of the Utah Constitution also require that
Expulsion of Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies Can Only be
Accomplished "by judicial determination/1 Not by Arbitrators
Plaintiffs1 right to have a court determine whether they will be deprived of the substantial
rights of membership and management in a limited liability company is also protected by the

5

The instrument entitled as the "AWARD" in its AWARD section does not order the
removal of Duke as the Manager. However, in the part entitled "ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN
COMMENTS" on page 6, paragraph 7, the arbitrator writes that"... R. Gragam [sic] as the
remaining manager." It is noteworthy that the Arbitrator does not consider the foregoing to be a
part of the AWARD. He states in the introductory paragraph "The comments are not to be
construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions of law." Emphasis added.
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Due Process and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution.6 The Utah Supreme Court
has held that both clauses "guarantee that litigants will have [their] fday in court'".7
The deprivation of the right to membership and management in a limited liability
company is a precious and protected right of property. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to their
"day in court" to preserve that interest.
V. The Arbitrator Herein Acted in "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
The statutory requirement that expulsion must be accomplished through "judicial
determination" is "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified as an arbitrator."8 The constitutional foundation of that right is equally obvious.
In this case, the arbitrator expressly cited Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c) as
the bases for his decision to expel Plaintiffs. He thereby made it eminently explicit that he
"appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decidefd] to ignore or pay

6

. Utah's Due Process Clause, Article I, section 7 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."

Utah's Open Courts Clause, Article I, section 11 provides:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party."
7

. Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. 2002 UT 6, ^ 38,44 P.3d 663.

8

. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996).
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no attention to it."9
Therefore, the Arbitrators award should be vacated.
VI. The Award Should be Vacated in its Entirety
In the remainder of his decision, the arbitrator purported to adjudicate grounds for
expulsion as set out in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3) which are reserved exclusively for
"judicial determination." Accordingly, the award should be vacated in its entirety.
VTI. Additional Grounds for the Vacation10 of the Arbitrator's Award.
A. The arbitrator erred in ruling against Zavala because of the provisions of UCA §482c-807(3). Zavala as a member owning ten percent (10%) in and of the Company's membership
interest and in the Company's profits and loses, enjoys limited immunity from liability as against
the Company and to the other members by virtue of the statute which states the following:
§ 48-2c-807(3) Duties of managers and members
(3) A member of a manager-managed company who is not also a manager owes no
fiduciary duties to the company or to other members solely by reason of acting in
the capacity of a member. (Emphasis added).

9

. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996).

10

The evidence in the record before the arbitrator does not support the arbitrator's factual
or legal conclusions. See: Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) ("an arbitrator exceeds his or her delegated power if the
arbitration award has no foundation in reason or fact and is, therefore completely irrational" or "
utterly lacking in evidentiary support"; see also Pacific Development L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36,
\1 n.3,23 P.3d 1035 ("completely irrational" ground is separate type of exceeding authority).
Each one of the below listed additional grounds are not supported by the record before the
arbitrator and the
D \WPDOCS\du 05\memo vacate award 081705 l.wpd
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There has not been produced any evidence before the arbitrator and none is cited in the
AWARD which purports to show that Zavala has acted in any capacity other than as a member.
At no time did Zavala become a manager of the Company. At no time did Zavala acted in any
way other than in her capacity as a member. The Arbitrator's determination to apply the same
legal standard to Zavala as to Duke is a manifest error.
B. The arbitrator erred in his AWARD in deciding that Duke and Zavala converted the
Company's personal property. The Company was not a party to this proceedings. A conversion
is an act of wilful interference with a "chattel, done without lawful justification" by which the
owner entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession11.
Because the Company - the owner of the alleged conversion - was not a party to the
arbitration, the arbitrator's AWARD should be vacated on that ground as well.
C. The arbitrator's interpretation of the non-competition clause to limit its scope to Utah
is in error. Section 3.8 of the Operating Agreement of the Company is unenforceable because its
geographic scope of prohibition is unreasonable.12 The arbitrator's decision to limit the non
competition agreement to Utah only is clearly erroneous, because its scope is unreasonable in its
geographic application. Assuming arguendo that section 3.8 of the Operating Agreement can be

n

Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2003 UT App 355, \% 78 P3d 988 (Ut App 2003).
Conversion has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as "a wrongful exercise of control over
personal property in violation of the rights of its owner." See also Frisco Joes Inc. v. Peav. 558
P.2d 1327,1330(1977).
12

Allen v Rose Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608,237 P.2d 823 (1951)
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modified by the arbitrator, it should be modified to apply to only the counties in which the
Company operates its stores, i.e., Salt Lake County, Washington County, and Davis County.
D. Duke and Zavala acted in good faith and on advice of counsel and therefore did not
convert any of the Company's personal property. Throughout the arbitration the only evidence
before the arbitrator was the fact that Duke after consulting with his St. George counsel, he
formed in April 2004, a new limited company, and opened new accounts for running the
business in St. George. For Graham to prevail on his theory of conversion the scienter of willful
conduct, is necessary. Duke acted in accordance with the following: Duke did make: (1) a
request for advice of counsel on the legality of a proposed action; (2) full disclosure of the
relevant facts to counsel; (3) receipt of advice from counsel that the action to be taken will be
legal, and (4) reliance in good faith on counsel's advice.13 As a matter of fact the evidence before
the arbitrator was only that Duke's advice was to do exactly what Duke did. As a matter of fact,
counsel for Duke, prepared the limited liability company, and he [Duke's counsel] filed it with
the Utah Division of Corporations. Additionally, Duke's counsel was the person who
communicated with Wells Fargo bank and established new accounts.
VIII. Plaintiffs Should be Awarded Their Costs, Attorney Fees and Expenses of Litigation
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-126 provides for the award of costs, attorney fees and expenses
of litigation in vacating an arbitrator's award. Since the arbitrators award should be vacated in its

13

. C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 859 F.2d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir.
1988)(federal securities law).
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entirety, Plaintiffs hereby request such costs, attorney fees and expenses.
DATED this

day of August, 2005.

NICKJ.CQWESSIDES
Attorney ffrPlaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned filed the original of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court:
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
and served a copy of the foregoing upon the following:
David R. Williams
Woodbury & Kesler, PC
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358
via fax;
and hand delivery
this /^cfay of August, 2005 addressed as set forth above.
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3
(Excerpts from Transcript of Hearings-R.371)

TED DUKE, ET AL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
RANDAL GRAHAM,
Defendant-Appellee.
DECEMBER 30,2005
INDEX
DISTRICT COURT NO. 040925274
SUPREME COURT NO. 20051036-SC
DATE
FILED
12-07-05
12-07-05
12-13-05
12-22-05
12-07-05

EXHIBITS

DOCUMENT
COPY OF COVER PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS
ON 02-22-05, 08-17-05, 08-24-05, 09-13-05,10-14-05
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT
ORDER DIRECTING OFFICER TO DELIVER PROPERTY
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF EXECUTION
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS ON 02-22-05,08-17-05,
08-24-05, 09-13-05,10-14-05

pAGE
NUMBERS
364
365

366-367
368-370
371
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual;
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as
purported arbitrator herein,
Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS

February 22, 2005
August 17, 2005
August 24, 2005
September 13,2005
October 14, 2005

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC
£ .

1 2095

SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByQh

Deputy Clerk

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
District Court Judge

|eri Kearbey
Certified Court Transcriber
12,-50 Gaylene Circle

Sandy, Utah 84094

-<? 1/,/i

TO:

The Utah Supreme Court
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attention: Pat Bartholomew
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,

OHo^^^7^
Case No. 20051036-SC

vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual;
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as
purported arbitrator herein,
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that on the 6th day of December 2005, a transcript of proceedings held
before The Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Court Judge, on February 22; August 17; August 24;
September 13 and October 14, 2005 in the above case were completed and delivered to the managing reporter
at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this 6th day of December 2005.

LJ£ri Kearttey
Certified Court Transcriber
566-4540

cc:

Nick J. Colessides, Attorney
David R Williams, W&K
Clerk of the Court

FILED DISTRICT SOUR!
Third Judicial District

DEC - 1 2005
COUNTV

By. ^

s

"

L A K E

Deputy Clerk

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2005, 3:09 P.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:
Duke versus Graham.

Okay.

We're here on the matter of

And, counsel, do you want to state your

appearances for the record?
MR. COLESSIDES:

Nick J. Colessides appearing on

behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor.
MR. WILLIAMS:

And David Williams appearing on

behalf of defendants Randall Graham and David Graham.
THE COURT:

Okay.

This matter came to the

attention of the Court on the filing of a motion for
temporary restraining order by the defendants seeking to
enforce the arbitration award of Kent Scott, which was
handed down recently.

And I have the motion for temporary

restraining order, proposed order.

I also have received,

about 2 0 minutes ago, the response of Mr. Colessides to
the — to the defendants' papers.
As I understand it, the parties have been
operating a business located in St. George and also up here
in this area.

What does the business do?

MR. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, the business sells, I

guess, furniture and furniture accessories imported from
Mexico, pottery, ironworks, those kinds of things.

It's a

retail store that essentially sells furniture and furniture
accessories.

16

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

And, apparently there was some

2

disagreement that occurred between the parties involving the

3

business and whether they should be allowed to open another

4

business.

5

parties went to an arbitration proceeding; is that correct?

6

Anyway, as a result of the disagreements, the

As I see it, the arbitration proceeding went about

7

seven days, and — and the decision of the arbitrator was

8

handed down.

9

allegations to the effect that the plaintiffs are in at

And then the defendants have made some

10

least alleged disregard of the arbitration award,

11

dissipating assets and continuing conduct that the

12

defendants feel is in violation of the award.

13

correct?

14

MR. WILLIAMS:

15

THE COURT:

Is that

That is correct, Your Honor.

And Mr. Colessides ! memo basically

16

says, "Award?

17

award."

18

enforced anyway because it's not in conformity with the law,

19

it's exceeding the authority of the arbitrator."

20

basically it?

21

What award?

We don't think there's any legal

And then — and if —

MR. COLESSIDES:

"whatever there is shouldn't be

Your Honor, yes.

Is that

Except I would

22

like to tell the Court Mr. Williams made a motion to also

23

confirm the award.

24

obviously, no objection because that's what we wanted to

25

have.

And to that motion, Your Honor, we have,

We wanted to have the award come to the Court and be

17

made by affidavit?
MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

Okay.

All right.

Well, the Court is — are you going to want to say
anything further at this point?
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

All right.

I'm going to grant the temporary restraining
order, and we'll set the matter for a preliminary injunction
hearing.

I'm going to further order that the status quo as

of the issuance of the arbitration award be implemented.
That is to say, all money, all checks that were in the bank
accounts or in the cash registers of the store are to be
returned forthwith.

All inventory is to be returned

forthwith.
MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

From where, Your Honor?

I don't know.

If there's inventory

that's been removed from storage units or from this other
facility that's been described, it is to be returned
forthwith, each piece.
The vehicle that has been used, after returning
the equipment, the vehicle — or the inventory, rather, after
returning the inventory, the vehicle is to be returned to
the store forthwith.
Possession of the business shall be delivered to

30

MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any further questions?

MR. WILLIAMS:

No, Your Honor.

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS:
MR. COLESSIDES:

Then we'll be in recess.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:44 p.m.,
the hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2 4 ,

THE COURT:

3
4

Duke v. Graham.

5

appearances?

P.M.

We're here on the matter of

Counsel, do you want to state your

Nick J. Colessides appearing on

behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor.
MR. WILLIAMS:

8

10

Okay.

MR. COLESSIDES:

6

9

2:29

-oooOooo-

2

7

2005,

David Williams appearing on behalf

of Randall Graham and David Graham, the defendants.

Randall

Graham is here in the courtroom with me, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

11

All right.

This is the time set for

12

preliminary hearing in this matter.

13

is your burden at this point, Mr. Williams.

14

going to do is allow you to go first.

15

proffer, try to save some time, whatever you'd like, cross-

16

examine after the proffer, or whatever you'd like to do.
MR. COLESSIDES:

17

This is — I think this
So what I'm

We can do it by

Your Honor, may I be heard for

18

one moment?

I'd be willing to — the time today is for the

19

motion for a preliminary injunction to be heard for argument

20

today.

21

But then they have their motion for preliminary injunction.

22

And I would further, instead of coming back again for a

23

permanent injunction, I would also stipulate so that the

24

matter of this part of the litigation be completed.

25

rest of it, Your Honor, it appears to me at least, that is

I'd be willing to stipulate to that, Your Honor.

The

38

1 is a — we are here on a motion — in a supplemental
2 proceeding or for a motion to enforce the award.

This is a

3 hearing for a preliminary injunction, I'm stipulating before
4 the Court, so I don't see why waste the judicial resources.
5

And, number two, instead of — not only I'm

6 stipulating to the issue of the preliminary injunction,
7 there's no — I will stipulate to the permanency of it as
8 well, so we don't have another hearing.
9

THE COURT:

Well, the temporary restraining order,

10 of course, is granted on the basis of probability of
11 prevailing — final determination prevailing.

So with

12 respect to your — with respect to your assumption that the
13 Court has already ruled on that, I've only ruled on the
14 probability of prevailing not on the ultimate fact.
15

I'm really disturbed by the representation of

16 Counsel that there has not been compliance with the
17 temporary restraining order.
18

MR. COLESSIDES:

Well, may I address that point,

19 Your Honor?
20

THE COURT:

Yeah.

21

MR. COLESSIDES:

The award — the arbitrator's

22 award came on — on Friday the 11th.

I communicated that

23 award, Your Honor, to the arbitrator — to the — to my
24 clients.

When they — over that same weekend.

When they

25 were locked out, they left and they went to — to Nevada to
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think that there's been compliance with the order.
Are you asking for a contempt citation against
them on this basis, or what are you asking for?
MR. WILLIAMS:

I will.

Yes, I do, Your Honor,

because they have not complied.
THE COURT:

All right.

You want to present

evidence on that fact, I'll hear the evidence.

And let's do

that first.
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

So go ahead and present your evidence.

MR. WILLIAMS:

We, first, Your Honor, would like

to call Maria Whitaker — Mary Whitaker, sorry.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Whitaker, come up and be

sworn.
I can tell you now that we're going to take no
more than 50 minutes to do this whole proceeding today, so
let's move right along.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Okay.

MARY WHITAKER,
called as a witness by the defendants,
being first duly sworn, was examined
and testified on her oath as follows:
THE COURT:

I want to hear evidence on compliance

with the order.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Okay.
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1
2

Q-

Is there any inventory that you are aware of that

exists but you do not have access to?

3

A.

The access that he removed.

4

Q.

I' m sorry?

5

A.

The inventory that he removed from the storage

6

units.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

That's the six storage units.

Thank you.

MR. COLESSIDES:

9
10

THE COURT:

11

MR. WILLIAMS:

That's all I have, Your Honor.

Any redirect?
Yeah.

One.

One question.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13 BY MR. WILLIAMS:
14

Q.

Is there inventory stored in storage units in

15 St. George?
16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And do you have access to those storage units?

18

A.

We do now.

But that access was not made available

19

to us and we were given access by the owners of those units

20

after we discussed with them the situation.

21 !

MR. WILLIAMS:

No further questions, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. COLESSIDES:

24

THE COURT:

25

I have one question.

Any cross — recross?
No, Your Honor.

All right.

You may step down.
That is:

Do you have any
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j

1 evidence to show that the temporary restraining order was
2

served on any of the defendants?

3

MR. WILLIAMS:

4

THE COURT:

I don't, Your Honor.

All right.

Well, I'm going to find at

5

this point that there is no violation of the restraining

6

order because it hasn't been served, and I'm going to

7

continue this process and we're going to continue the

8

temporary restraining order.

9

I'm going to ask that the plaintiffs provide any

10 proceeds from any sales that they've received on any
11 business that they have been conducting anywhere following
12 the date of the arbitration award.

That would include any

13 business here in Utah, any business in Nevada or any other
14 state.
15

I also want them to produce copies of their bank

16 accounts and any — any accounts in their names.
17

Counsel, I also want you to provide for the

18 defendants an address where the plaintiffs may be served the
19 temporary restraining order.
20

21

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Honor, I can't because I do

not have one.

22

THE COURT:

Do you have any contact — way of

23

contacting these people?

24

any —

25

And can you do that today?

MR. COLESSIDES:

Do they have any cell phones or

By cell phone only, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

Your Honor?

Yes.

MR. COLESSIDES:

May I ask for clarification

purposes?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. COLESSIDES:

If the Court found that there is

no violat ion of the temporary restraining order, may I — if
I were to stipulate, wouldn't that obviate —
THE COURT:

I've only found that he has not shown

that the — the temporary restraining order has been served,
and so I expect that to be served and I want to hear what
the other side has to say about it.

And we'll hear on the

13th what they have to say about it.
MR. COLESSIDES:

Okay?

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

THE CLERK:

Court is in recess.

(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:41 p.m.,
the hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-
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2
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3

THE COURT:

Okay, counsel, do you want to state

4

your appearances, please?

5

MR. COLESSIDES:

6

behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor.

7
8

Nick J. Colessides appearing on

MR. WILLIAMS:

David Williams on behalf of the

defendants.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

This is a

10 continuation of the prior session, and there were a number
11

of questions that the Court had about the current status of

12 things.
13

Counsel, Mr. Williams, do you want to tell me

14 what's going on currently?
15

MR. WILLIAMS:

I do, Your Honor.

16

In terms of the factual status of the case,

17

nothing has changed since the previous hearing.

18

by that is that none of the assets which were ordered to be

19

returned have been returned.

20

service of the temporary restraining order and the amended

21

temporary restraining order, we were unable to locate the

22

plaintiffs, but it appears that they are here today.

23

What I mean

We had attempted a personal

And so I think that, procedurally, the status is

24

that we have several pending motions, we have our motion for

25

a temporary restraining order, which our current motion is
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1 to have it converted into an injunction.
2 to confirm the arbitrator's award.

We have our motion

We have our motion for a

3 judgment conforming to the arbitrator's award.

We have a

4 motion that was made orally at the last hearing but,
5 essentially, an order — or a motion for a finding of
6 contempt for their failure to obey the temporary restraining
7 order.
8

Also pending is the plaintiff's motion to vacate

9 or modify the arbitrator's award.

And so that I think that,

10 today, those motions are — are pending and need to be
11 resolved.
12

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have a copy of the

13 order?
14

MR. WILLIAMS:

15 restraining order.

I have a copy of the temporary

I did not bring a copy.

I inadvertently

16 left the amended restraining order at the office, but my
17 secretary's bringing it and it'll be here in a few minutes.
18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let's begin with the

19 motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction.
20

MR. WILLIAMS:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you want to say anything about

22 that?
23

MR. WILLIAMS:

24

Essentially, the elements are the same.

I do, Your Honor.

I would like to.
What I

25 mean the elements are the same, the elements for obtaining
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1

MR. COLESSIDES:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. COLESSIDES:

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right?
I understand that.

Okay.

And go ahead and tell me, then,

5

what your arguments are on converting the TRO to preliminary

6

or permanent injunction.

7

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Honor, the basis for — as

8

you look at the award, Your Honor, the award does not, under

9

any circumstances, provide for the return of monies and for

10

the return of a truck.

11

Honor —

12

THE COURT:

As you look at the award, Your

I'm not talking about the award.

I'm

13

talking about the Court's order that's in place, that's been

14

in place for, I don't know, a month and a half, I guess.

15
16
17

MR. COLESSIDES:

And this is the — this is the

dilemma that we have, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, your clients obey

18

the Court's order, okay?

19

what the arbitration — for the purpose of this Court's

20

order, it doesn't matter what the arbitration award is.

21

That's the order.

22

That's what they do.

I don't care

And that's what they comply with, okay?

Now, we can deal with these other issues, and if

23

it's necessary to do that, fine.

But the reason that order

24

was put in place was to maintain the status quo.

25

was — that was what the Court said.

And that

And that followed the
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wrote a check out of the company account not only to pay the
arbitrator fees but to pay their personal legal fees.
have an issue with that.

We

But, nonetheless, we would be

willing to stipulate that the money that is in the account
be used to satisfy or to pay — to make good that check, and
then we'll take up the fact that they still owe that money
to the company at a later date.

But we would — we would

stipulate that that money go to the arbitrator.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, Court will order

that the account be unfrozen and that the arbitrator's check
be honored.
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any additional money would be assets

of the company.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. COLESSIDES:

Is the Court going to take the

issue of the award, the confirmation of the award, Your
Honor?
THE COURT:
do that.

I don't think that today is the day to

I think we need to hear, perhaps, more evidence on

that issue.

I don't want to even go into that until we have

the status re-established.

So we can set another time to do

that.
MR. COLESSIDES:

For purposes of this hearing,

Your Honor, may I make a pro forma objection?

That is —
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THE COURT:

All right.

If there's any issue

regarding cooperation in dealing with that, I assume you'
bring it to the attention of the Court.
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

We will.

Okay.

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

Then we'll be in recess.
Thank you.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at the hour of 11:58 a.m.,
the hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-

1
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3

THE COURT:

4

MR. COLESSIDES:

5

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, sir.

Apparently, we had a matter scheduled

that didn't get on our calendar today.

7

delay.

10
11

P.M.

Good afternoon.

6

9

2:05

-oooOooo-

2

8

2005,

We apologize for the

Counsel, do you want to state your appearances?
MR. COLESSIDES:

Nick J. Colessides appearing on

behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor.
MR. WILLIAMS:

David Williams appearing on behalf

of the defendant, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

that are, apparently, pending.

14

confirming the arbitration award, and we have also, as I see

15

the file, a motion by the plaintiffs to vacate the

16

arbitrator's award.

17

Okay.

18

consider today?

19
20
21

Okay.

We have a couple of matters
One's a proposed order

That was filed back in August.

Are there other matters that are — to

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Honor, yes.

There's a

couple of matter.
Insofar as — and the minor item is something we

22

agreed upon between Mr. Williams and myself.

As it relates

23

to the truck which was already returned to the credit union,

24

we made the agreement that Mr. Duke may take — because

25

there's no equity in the truck, Your Honor — may take the
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1

MR. COLESSIDES:

2

THE COURT:

2001.

And the section dealing with vacating

3

the award was last changed May 15th, 2003.

So, it would

4

seem to me that, if that's true, that — you know, the

5

legislature obviously could have changed that.

6

have stuck in some language that would have modified it or,

7

you know, qualified it some way.

8

there's a — if there's a technical problem regarding

9

notifying the State — or the corporations department, I

They could

They didn't do that.

If

10 would assume that, when the — when the order is confirmed by
11 the Court, which is the prerogative of either party to the
12 arbitration award, I assume, then if it's necessary to
13 notify the State at that point, they can be notified.
14

And, in that sense, I suppose it is even qualified

15 as a judicial determination.

But I don't see — I don't see

16 this as exceeding the arbitrator's award.

And if that's the

17 only issue that we're talking about, I would — I would find
18 that, as a matter of law, that that does not exceed the
19 arbitrator's authority.
20

21
22

Do you have — is there another point where you

think —
MR. COLESSIDES:

The only point I'm making, Your

23

Honor, is I don't quite know if that specific version of

24

the — the specific portion of the Act, Exceeding Authority,

25

is not — does not — precedes 2001 and may go back to 1990.
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1

for other reasons.

For example, as I've indicated, I think

2

that the fact that this order is subject to being confirmed

3

judicially that it then becomes a judicial determination in

4

the same sense as required under the statute.

5

way, I think that it's covered.

6

challenge that in an appropriate forum at an appropriate

7

time.

So, either

And, certainly, you could

8

MR. COLESSIDES:

9

May I ask a clarification, Your Honor?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. COLESSIDES:

I understand that, Your Honor.

Sure.
AS I see the award — as I

12 understand the ruling of the Court, it would be that it
13
14
15

confirms the award as stated in No. 1, 2, 3...
THE COURT:

Well, I think the award is unusual in

that the arbitrator goes on to say —

16

MR. COLESSIDES:

17

THE COURT:

18

— that he's adding some additional

paragraphs —

19

MR. COLESSIDES:

20

THE COURT:

21

Right.

Right.

— not by way of findings or

conclusions but by way of clarification and explanation.

22

MR. COLESSIDES:

23

THE COURT:

And my —

And I've seen a lot of arbitration

24

awards over the years; I've never seen that kind o£ language

25

included in an award.

I haven't read that many by
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Arbitrator Scott, but I think the award has to be looked at
in the context of all of the pages from the beginning until
the end, and whether it's by clarification or by explanation
or whatever, and I think it has to be read in its entirety.
And I don't intend, in confirming the award, which I would
do unless there's some other point that's made that would
convince me not to, I would not intend to confirm only a
part of that award or the first 16 lines of that award but,
rather, the entire award, from the beginning all the way to
the end.

And I — let me see how many pages we've got here.
MR. COLESSIDES:

Pages 1 through 8, Your Honor.

That's the eighth, the signature page.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

I think that it would be all —

Okay.

— all eight pages.

MR. COLESSIDES:

All right.

You would adopt

them — the Court would adopt them, what the arbitrator — and
that's for clarification purposes so I'll know which way the
Court is ruling, Your Honor.

Because I am at a loss,

somehow, to explain the arbitrator's language on line 10 of
page 3 that says the comments are not to be construed or
taken to be findings of fact or conclusions of law.
So I do not — with all due respect, Your Honor,
when the Court confirms the award, do you confirm that part
of the award as a — as a part of the order?
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1

THE COURT:

I do.

2

MR. COLESSIDES:

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

He says that they are provided to

4 assist the parties and their counsel to understand the
5 reasons that form the basis for the award.
6 calls them findings of fact or conclusions.
7 he has to.

Howevei:, he
I don't think

I think he's saying, "These are the reasons why

8 I've given my award."

And I think they are of an cissist in

9 trying to understand the whole context of the award.
10

MR. COLESSIDES:

Okay.

I just wanted to make

11 that — help me understand that part, Your Honor.
12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. COLESSIDES:

You're not limiting the award to

14 the award only, but you're including, by reference,
15 everything else.

Okay.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

That's all.

Okay.
Your Honor, and I guess I apologize

18 if you hadn't ruled, but I — if you have ruled, I would like
19 to submit a —
20
21

THE COURT:

Well, I understand from Mr. Colessides

that he has nothing further to add.

So based on that, my —

22 my ruling would be, as I indicated, that I would confirm the
23 award from page 1 through page 8, the entire document, as
24 the award in this matter.
25

MR. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I have submitted, and I
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1

judgment as well as attaching it as an exhibit, just so that

2

I would be sure to comply with that rule.

3
4

THE COURT:

So you're \not adopting by reference,

you're just repeating verbatim everything in the award.

5

MR. WILLIAMS:

6

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So your representation to me and to

7

Mr. Colessides is that, other than misspelling "judgment,"

8

you have copied everything verbatim, including nothing more,

9

and leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the award,

10 other than the beginning statements and the concluding
11
12

signatures.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Yes, Your Honor.

13 oh, there is one — there is one change.
14

THE COURT:

15

MR. WILLIAMS:

16

"Arbitrator's Written Comments."

On page 4 —

All right.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WILLIAMS:

19

There may be —

— right under where it says

Uh-huh.
"At the request of the parties, the

arbitrator is..."

20

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

21

MR. WILLIAMS:

I inserted that language because he

22

u s e d — I think he named himself or "I am."

23

request of the parties, I am providing..."

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

He said, "At the

So —

And just by bracket, I said the
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1

arbitrator is rather than saying "I am."

2

THE COURT:

All right.

Okay.

Well, it would

3

appear to me that this is in order.

I don't know that it

4

does anything different from signing the confirmation order

5

that I've signed.

6

Mr. Colessides wants to state some other substantive

7

objection.

So I'm going to go ahead, unless

8

MR. COLESSIDES:

9

Your Honor, to review it.

I have not had an opportunity,
I just looked at it as it was

10 given to me.
11

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm going to sign it.

12 I'll give you — if you need 3 0 days to — if you want to
13 raise an objection, I'll be happy to let you do it.
14

MR. COLESSIDES:

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Okay.

16 compliment counsel on both sides.

Again, I want to
I think you've both done

17 a superb job in trying to educate the Court and brief this
18 matter.

I think your representation of your clients has

19 been vigorous and has been thorough.
20

you on that.

21

thorough job.

22

I compliment both of

I wish everybody who came in did such a

Obviously, in these cases, one side prevails and

23

one side doesn't prevail.

In this case, it would appear to

24

the Court that the defendants have prevailed and they would

25

be entitled to your relief under that — under that
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1

conclusion,

2

I would just reiterate what I said.

3

arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe

4 I 150 arbitration cases.
5

I think I've

on a number of cases.

I have served as an arbitrator also

And I feel that it is a — it is a

6 I good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the
7

award of the arbitrator has such a potential finality.

8

in this instance, it's obvious that the plaintiffs don't

And

9 J agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's
10

their prerogative.

11

be enforced under the law.
So, again, thank you.

12
13

But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't

you've done.

I compliment you on what

And, unless there's something further, we'll

14 I be in recess,
15

J

MR. COLESSIDES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

16

MR. WILLIAMS:

17 I

(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:06 p.m.,

18
19 I

Thank you, Your Honor,

the hearing was concluded.)
-oooOooo-

20
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22
23
24
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